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For over 200 years, the United States in time of both war
and peace has been served by the citizen-soldier. Indeed, due
in part to the cost of a large standing military force, the fed-
eral government views a strong National Guard and reserve
program as crucial components of our national defense.1
Wisconsin has and will continue to play a significant role
in this effort. The Wisconsin Army and Air National Guard
presently has 11,200 members2 and over 12,000 additional
Wisconsin residents serve in the Army, Air Force, Navy,
Marine Corp, and Coast Guard Reserve.
All of these individuals are Selected Reservists, that is,
they are obligated to serve two-week periods of annual active
duty for training at locations throughout the world. In addi-
* B.S., Carroll College, 1971; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1975; Commissioner,
Supreme Court of Wisconsin; Captain, Judge Advocate General's Corp, United States
Army Reserve. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the opinions of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin or the Depart-
ment of Defense.
1. Congress has termed the National Guard and Reserve Forces an "integral part
of the total force policy of the United States." Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1130, 96 Stat. 759
(1982). Since 1973, the Department of Defense has implemented the Total Force Policy
which decrees that the defense forces of the United States will consist of the minimum
active duty force necessary to maintain the peace, supported by a reinvigorated, well-
trained, reserve. "In 1986, the active armed force of 2.2 million was complemented by
1.6 million Ready Reservists, which includes both the Selected Reserve and the Individ-
ual Ready Reserve, both of which are considered 'active' as opposed to 'inactive'
reserves." ANN. REP. RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD (1986) (Office of the Secretary
of Defense).
2. Interview with Donald Erickson, Public Affairs Office, Wisconsin National
Guard, in Madison, Wis. (April 1, 1987). Although the exact number fluctuates, as of
March, 1987, the Army National Guard had approximately 9,200 active members and
the Air National Guard had 2,000. Id.
3. Interview with Timothy Downey, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs, in Washington, D.C. (April 7, 1987). Again, the exact number may vary
at any given time but as of March, 1987, Wisconsin had 21,027 enlisted personnel and
2,697 officers, for a total of 23,724 individuals participating as Selected Reservists as
part of both Guard and Reserve programs. Id.
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tion, in most cases they must serve an initial period of four or
more months of active duty for training and sixteen hours of
local inactive duty for training a month, usually served on
weekends. Further, they are of course subject to being called
to active duty for non-training purposes for varying periods in
the event of a national emergency and, in the case of the Na-
tional Guard, a state emergency.4
This obligation often conflicts with the reservist's civilian
employment, in some instances resulting in disputes with his
or her employer. Understandably, one of the reservist's great-
est concerns is the employment rights he or she enjoys. Every
reservist would agree with the opinion of one federal court:
The very existence of the nation depends upon its ability to
have a military force trained and skilled in the complex tech-
nology of modem warfare. Those who accept the obligation
of military service are entitled to more than neutral treat-
ment, or to be treated no differently than those who do not
accept this obligation.5
The purpose of this article is to outline the public and pri-
vate sector employment protection afforded the Wisconsin re-
servist by federal and state law in the area of hiring, incidents
and advantages of employment, and retention and restora-
tion. Statutory provisions at both levels of government will be
the primary focus. State common law rights and recent fed-
eral and state court decisions will also be discussed.
I. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AFFORDED THE MILITARY
RESERVIST UNDER FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
Congress has provided the military reservist with broad re-
employment rights. Although some form of protection has
been available since 1940,6 the current statute, commonly re-
4. In addition, some members of the Individual Ready Reserve, which in the case
of the Army Reserve numbers more than 300,000 nationwide, may serve some periods
of active duty for trainipg, although many serve no inactive or active duty for training
or any other purpose.
5. Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 446 F. Supp. 616, 620 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
6. Several acts between 1940 and 1968 provided employment protection to military
personnel. See Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720. § 8, 54 Stat. 885.
890 (1940); Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 9, 62 Stat. 604, 614 (1948) (as
amended by the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-491, § 1. 82
Stat. 790 (1968)); Universal Military Training and Service Act, ch. 144. § l(s). 65 Stat.
75, 86 (1951); Reserve Forces Act of 1955, ch. 665, § 262(f), 69 Stat. 598, 602 (1955).
[Vol. 71:75
1987] EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF MILITARY RESERVIST 77
ferred to as the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act,7 is the
result of the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance
Act of 19728 as amended by the Veterans' Benefits Improve-
ment and Health Care Authorization Act of 1986. 9 The key
provision, section 2021(b)(3), succinctly states:
Any person who seeks or holds a position [in federal govern-
ment, state government or a subdivision thereof, or private
employment] shall not be denied hiring, retention in employ-
ment, or any promotion or other incident or advantage of
employment because of any obligation as a member of a Re-
serve component of the Armed Forces.'"
A. Hiring
The protection afforded by section 2021(b)(3) in the area
of hiring did not exist until the 1986 amendment. It nonethe-
less addresses what has been a long-standing concern: an em-
ployer's refusal to hire a military reservist because of the
accommodations that will have to be granted, and the in-
convenience that will result because of that individual's mili-
tary obligations."
The United States Department of Labor has taken the po-
sition that an employer shall be considered to have refused to
hire if either:
(1) the sole reason or part of the reason to not hire was
because of the military obligation; or
(2) in light of all the circumstances, and not withstanding
any other reason or reasons which may have weighed
in the employer's decision, the reservist would have
been hired but for the military obligation.' 2
Although vaguely stated, this appears to mean that for
purposes of assisting the reservist, the Department of Labor
7. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-26 (1985-86). See infra Appendix at 98-107.
8. Act of Dec. 3, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-508, § 404-05, 88 Stat. 1578, 1594-1600 (as
amended by Act of May 14, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-286, § 2, 90 Stat. 517, 518 (adding
§ 2024(g)).
9. Act effective Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-576, § 331.
10. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987). See infra Appendix at 100.
11. For example, in Kemp v. Washington Post, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2394
(D.D.C. Nov. 30, 1981) (no violation was found where the employer withdrew a job
offer after learning of the applicant's reserve obligation).
12. Information letter, "New Discrimination Law for Members of the Reserve/
Guard," Department of Labor, Veterans' Employment and Training Service. Office of
Veterans' Reemployment Rights, Madison, Wis.
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will consider a discriminatory act to have occurred in a
"mixed motive" situation if any part of the refusal to hire was
based on the military obligation, even if there were other rea-
sons for non-hire that would have led to the same result re-
gardless of the military obligation. The Department of Labor
apparently will allow the courts in future cases to determine
the controlling standard of causation as well as set the overall
parameters of the new law.13
B. Incidents and Advantages of Employment
The prohibition in section 2021(b)(C) against depriving re-
servists of the incidents and advantages of employment is very
controversial and has proven to be difficult to interpret (with
the exclusion of the expressly stated right to promotional
opportunities). 14
Prior to 1982, lower federal courts tended to interpret this
provision broadly, consistent with congressional intent which
called for a liberal construction of the entire Veterans Reem-
ployment Rights Act. 15 The courts had gone so far as to state
that employers had to take positive action to grant reservists
rights that might not necessarily be afforded other employ-
ees. 16 As a result, the term "incidents and advantages of em-
ployment" covers a wide variety of situations, for example:
13. An "in part" standard would result in a violation if any part of the reason for
refusal to hire is based on the protected activity, even if there were other valid reasons
for non-hiring that would have led to the same result. See, e.g., Cook v. 84 Lumber Co.,
118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2639 (N.D. Ohio July 10, 1984). A "but-for" test would require
proof that hiring would have resulted but for the discriminatory motive. See, e.g.,
Clayton v. Blachowske Truck Lines, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd,
815 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987). There is uncertainty over the proper standard to be
utilized in other aspects of the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act. See, e.g.. Chesna
v. Int'l Fueling Co., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2913 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1984).
14. For example, Henry v. Anderson County, Tenn. Office of Sheriff, 522 F. Supp.
1112 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) held that the demotion of a county sheriff sergeant prior to
termination, due to his reserve affiliation, was a clear violation of the statute.
15. See, e.g., Bottger v. Doss Aeronautical Serv., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Ala.
1985).
16. Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 446 F. Supp. 616, 620 (N.D. Ohio 1978). rev'd,
613 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 452 U.S. 549 (1981).
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(1) The opportunity to make up overtime missed during
reserve duty even though employees on non-military
leave would not get this opportunity. 7
(2) The right to holiday pay and full vacation rights as if
the reservist had not been absent. 8
(3) Prohibition of reassignment to less desirable shifts.' 9
(4) The right to scheduling accommodations to assure a
40-hour work week."
A few courts had taken a more narrow interpretation,
holding for example that the right to work overtime did not
accrue because of employee status but because a work require-
ment was fulfilled; and therefore, it was not a part of the inci-
dents and advantages of employment.2'
The United States Supreme Court then struck a blow
against the liberal construction of this provision in Monroe v.
Standard Oil Company Co.22 The reservist in that case had
not been permitted by his employer to make up work time lost
when his rotating work schedule conflicted with military
training. The federal district court held that a violation oc-
curred because the employer should have accommodated the
employee's reserve obligation. But both the court of appeals 23
and the Supreme Court disagreed. The latter, by a 5-4 vote,
held that section 2021(b)(3) required only that reservists be
protected against discriminations like discharge or demotion
and was not intended to cover factors such as missed work
hours or a duty on the employer to accommodate the
reservist.24
17. Carney v. Cummins Engine Co., 602 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1073 (1980); Lott v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 395 F. Supp. 866, 870 (N.D.
Ohio 1975).
18. Hilliard v. N.J. Army Nat'l Guard, 527 F. Supp. 405 (D. N.J. 1981); Kidder v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1060, 1066 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
19. Carlson v. N.H. Dept. of Safety, 609 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 913 (1980) (employee could not be assigned to rotating shifts and weekends upon
return from six weeks active duty with Air Force Reserve when he had previously been
assigned only to weekdays).
20. West v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 609 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 1980).
21. Breeding v. TRW, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (M.D. Tenn 1979), aff'd, 665
F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1981).
22. 452 U.S. 549 (1981).
23. Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 613 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1980).
24. Monroe, 452 U.S. at 565-66.
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Commentators were understandably quick to criticize
Monroe, viewing it as unduly narrowing, if not virtually elimi-
nating, the concept of incidents and advantages of employ-
ment, assuming its holding would not be restricted in the
future to just scheduling situations.25 Perhaps because of its
bare majority, the impact of Monroe has been limited. Entitle-
ment to seniority stock benefits and recall list eligibility,
notwithstanding military leave, has still been recognized.26
The district court in Waltermeyer v. Aluminum Co. of
America,27 cited Monroe for the proposition that employers do
not have to grant special benefits to employee-reservists that
are not available to other employees. 8 Accordingly, the court
held that a member of the Pennsylvania National Guard
could be denied holiday pay for dates during which he was in
annual training, since the collective bargaining agreement did
not specify such payment. Curiously, the court was not
swayed by the fact that other categories of employees (e.g.,
those on jury duty during the week of the holiday) were speci-
fied as being entitled to the holiday pay.2 9
The court of appeals took notice of this and reversed,
agreeing that reservists are not entitled to special privileges,
but holding that in this instance the reservist was simply being
brought up to the level of other employees. 30 However, a dis-
senting judge sought a strict interpretation of Monroe and as-
serted that holiday pay for reservists-military service being a
voluntary activity unlike jury duty-was essentially ordering
the employer to pay the reservist wages during the absence.31
25. Sharp, Reservist Employment Rights, 22 A.F. L. REV. 374 (1980-81); Com-
ment, Military Reservist-Employees' Rights Under 38 U.S.C. Sec. 2021(b)(3)-What is
an Incident or Advantage of Employment?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877 (1982).
26. Winders v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1512, 1519 (D. N.J.
1984) (employee was entitled to reinstatement when he completed his active duty and
was entitled at that time to seniority and stock benefit rights that had accrued during his
leave of absence); Colon v. County of Shawnee, 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3213, 3215 (10th
Cir. Mar. 31, 1987) (restoration to lay off status returned employee to the employment
status he enjoyed at the time he began active duty).
27. 633 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 804 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1986).
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id.
30. Waltermeyer v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 804 F.2d 821, 825 (3d Cir. 1986).
31. Id. at 826-27 (Hunter, C.J., dissenting).
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In Sawyer v. Swift & Co.,32 a naval reservist on a second
shift job sought time off from work to travel from Kansas City
to Memphis for drills. The employer terminated him and ar-
gued in defense that Monroe did not require such a schedul-
ing accommodation. The federal district court refused to
construe Monroe so broadly holding it only restricted reserv-
ists' requests to reschedule work as opposed to a simple re-
quest for an excused absence.
On the other side, Rumsey v. New York State Department
of Correctional Services 33 strictly construed Monroe and held
that reservist/prison employees could be required to utilize
formal shift switching procedures to avoid conflicts with re-
serve duty, resulting in some disadvantage, even where em-
ployees on other types of leave did not, stating that "Monroe
makes it clear that [Congress] does not require that the em-
ployer treat the employee-reservist in every single respect as if
the reservist's military obligation did not exist, even to the
point of arranging 'special accommodations.' ,34
The scope of the incidents and advantages protection thus
remains unsettled. Nonetheless, it remains a viable compo-
nent of the reservist's employment protection as evidenced by
Waltermyer and Swift. In light of Monroe, the Department of
Labor has taken the position that an employer need not make
up lost overtime or rearrange a work schedule to avoid con-
flicts with military duty. The Department terms vacation eli-
gibility a complex issue that should be evaluated in light of the
particular facts of any given situation.35
32. 610 F. Supp. 38 (D. Kan. 1985).
33. 569 F. Supp. 358 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated in part, 580 F. Supp. 1052
(N.D.N.Y. 1984). See also Batayola v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 798 F.2d
355 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3186 (1987). In Batayola, a part-time bus
driver, who missed a chance to apply for full-time employment because the recruiting
period occurred while he was on a one-month leave with the Marine Corps Reserve,
was held to have no right to entitlement to the job on an automatic basis since the
likelihood of him having been hired full-time, according to the court, depended on his
fitness and ability rather than merely his status as a part-time driver; it could not be
stated with reasonable certainty that he would have gotten the full-time job. However,
the court did not cite Monroe in support of its holding. Id.
34. Rumsey, 569 F. Supp. at 361.
35. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Veterans' Employment and Training Service, Office of
Veterans' Reemployment Rights, Job Rights for Reservists and Members of the National
Guard (undated). The OVRR does attempt the following generalization, however:
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C. Restoration and Retention
As noted, section 2021 (b)(3) expressly requires that reten-
tion in employment shall not be denied to the military reserv-
ist.36 Several additional provisions of the code deal in greater
detail with particular circumstances the reservist may encoun-
ter and expand on this overall right.3
First, section 2024(c) provides that any reservist ordered
to an initial period of active duty for training for three or
more consecutive months38 is entitled to be restored to his po-
sition without loss of seniority, status, or pay,39 under the fol-
lowing conditions:
(1) the reservist must apply for reemployment within 31
days of release from active duty (or a period of hos-
pitalization as a result of that active duty);
Where eligibility for vacation depends on fulfilling a work requirement, reservist
employees must perform the work to be entitled to the vacation. Where the
value of vacation depends upon years of service, the reservist's vacation is deter-
mined by continuous employment and absence at reserve training is to be
counted toward the value of the vacation.
Id.
36. Numerous cases have arisen under these provisions. See, e.g., Weber v. Logan
County Home for the Aged, 623 F. Supp. 711 (D. N.D. 1985), aff'd, 804 F.2d 1058 (8th
Cir. 1986) (discharge within 24 hours of critical inquiry by employer of National Guard
status constituted a violation); Micalone v. Long Island R.R., 582 F. Supp. 973
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (forced resignation of National Guardsman because military leave not
approved held a violation); Bankston v. Stratton-Baldwin Co., 441 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.
Ala. 1977) (discharge of Air Force Reservist because of 15 days annual training held to
be a clear violation). The burden of justifying the discharge is on the employer. Henry
v. Anderson County, Tenn. Office of Sheriff, 522 F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (E.D. Tenn.
1981).
37. All of these rights apply equally to reservists and National Guardsmen while
training or under federal control, notwithstanding technical distinctions in the manner
in which the duty arises. However, Guardsmen performing active duty in a state emer-
gency are not protected since such duty does not arise under any of the listed code
sections in 38 U.S.C. § 2024(f). Curiously, the overall scheme of protection outlined in
§ 2021(b)(3) does not contain such a limitation. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)(3),
2024(f) (1986). See infra Appendix at 100, 106.
38. The three consecutive month requirement is not construed strictly. Zeczycki v.
Trinity Memorial Hosp., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2163 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 20, 1983) (an ini-
tial active duty for training, split into two components each less than three months, still
fit within the statute).
39. Pursuant to §§ 2021(b)(1) and (2), insurance and other benefits upon restora-
tion are treated in the same manner as they would be for other employees on leave for
other reasons, depending upon the established rules and practices of the employer. See
infra Appendix at 99.
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(2) the service rendered to the Armed Forces must have
been "satisfactory";4"
(3) the reservist is still qualified to perform the duties of
the position;41 and
(4) the position was not temporary.42
The statute further provides that any person restored to em-
ployment in this manner cannot be discharged from that posi-
tion without cause within six months after restoration, a
significant restriction on the normal employment-at-will
situation.4 3
However, a possibly significant restriction in the case of
state and local government and private employers (but not the
federal government) is that the employer may deny these res-
toration rights if its "circumstances have so changed as to
make it impossible or unreasonable to do so." What is impos-
sible or unreasonable in any given instance is undoubtedly
subject to differing perceptions, but the qualification has been
said to be very limited in nature.44
Second, pursuant to section 2024(g), reservists ordered to
active duty for less than ninety days under the President's
emergency powers have the same rights. This is designed to
parallel the rights of the reservist who is called up for such
40. What this means is unclear since no formal discharge with its attendant charac-
terization of service (i.e., honorable) usually results from the initial active duty for train-
ing, the reservist still being obligated to a term of service. However, the reservist in this
situation does receive a formal, written release from IADT which probably would serve
to reflect the nature of his or her service.
41. If not qualified due to a service-related disability, the reservist is entitled to the
nearest comparable job with that employer that has duties the reservist can perform. 38
U.S.C. § 2021(a)(A)(ii), incorporated by reference 38 U.S.C. § 2024(c) (1985-86). See
infra Appendix at 98.
42. A temporary position is one in which there is no reasonable expectation of
continued employment. Schilz v. City of Taylor, 640 F. Supp. 160, 163 (E.D. Mich.
1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1987). Also, the reservist must be an employee and
not, for example, an independent contractor. Travis v. Schwartz Mfg. Co., 216 F.2d
448, 453 (7th Cir. 1954).
43. 38 U.S.C. § 2024(c) (1986). See infra Appendix at 104-05.
44. For example, where reinstatement would create a useless job or where there has
been a reduction in the work force that reasonably would have included the reservist,
there is no obligation to rehire. Davis v. Halifax County School System, 508 F. Supp.
966, 968 (E.D.N.C. 1981). Sale of the business is also sufficient to deny reemployment.
Anthony v. Basic Am. Foods, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 352, 357 (N.D. Cal. 1984). But a
restoration that might result in loss of efficiency or economy of operations does not
alone render a refusal to rehire reasonable. Loeb v. Kivo, 77 F. Supp. 523, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd, 169 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 891 (1948).
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periods for operational missions as opposed to routine
training.45
Finally, pursuant to section 2024(d), a catch-all provision,
reservists performing any inactive or active duty for training
(other than the initial active duty for training) for any length
of time46 that conflicts with work are entitled to return to their
employment with such seniority, status, pay and vacation as
would have been due but for the absence, provided:
(1) the leave of absence was requested; 47
(2) the request was reasonable; 4
45. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 673(i) (West Supp. 1987).
46. See, e.g., Anthony, 600 F. Supp. at 357 (four and a half months of non-initial
active duty for training covered).
47. This request is actually more of a notice since in most circumstances the em-
ployer will have no right to deny the request or veto the timing, duration, etc., of the
military duty. Department of Labor, Veterans' Employment and Training Service, Of-
fice of Veterans' Reemployment Rights, Fact Sheet No. OASVET-86-1 (1986). The re-
servist also need not present written military orders since they frequently are not
available until after the duty has started. Id. The reservist should, of course, give the
employer as much advance notice as possible although no particular minimum period is
established by law.
The request/notice requirement must be taken seriously. An employee can be law-
fully discharged for failure to comply. Harrell v. C.C. Mayes Co., 113 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2287 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 1983); Blackmon v. Observer Transp. Co., 119
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2417 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 1982). However, if the request is wrong-
fully refused, the reservist can take the leave nonetheless and still be entitled to restora-
tion upon his or her return. Green v. Spartan Stores, Inc., 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2099,
2102 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 1982). It should be stressed that this request requirement
does not apply to initial active duty for training, sec. 2024(c) containing no such lan-
guage. 38 U.S.C. § 2024(c) (1986). See infra Appendix at 104-05.
48. Although not required by statute, many courts have imposed a requirement
that the request be reasonable in the context of both the military obligation and the
needs of the employer. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Pensacola, 634 F.2d 886, 888 (5th Cir.
1981); Bottger v. Doss Aeronautical Services, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Ala. 1985).
These courts appear to interpret this liberally in favor of the reservist. In Bottger, the
reservist was held to be reasonably entitled to twenty-six days of leave for active duty
for training even though he had just come back from his annual training and thirty to
fifty percent of the employer's personnel were reservists with this leave occurring at the
height of the annual training "season". The court noted that the training opportunity
was only to be offered at that time with no other dates available. Id. at 587. Similarly,
in Anthony, 600 F. Supp. at 355-57, the request was considered reasonable even though
the need for the active duty was not pressing from the reservist's standpoint and per-
haps could have been accomplished by correspondence courses. Id. However, in Gulf
States Paper Corp. v. Ingram, 633 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ala. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 1464
(11 th Cir. 1987), an army reservist was held to have resigned without reemployment
rights where she took an unauthorized one year absence to attend a civilian nursing
school. The court noted that this caused the employer hardship due to a shortage of
employees in the reservist's area and the schooling was only to enhance her reserve
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(3) the reservist reports for work at the beginning of the
next working period after returning from duty or at-
tendant hospitalization (or within a reasonable time if
there is an unavoidable delay in returning); delays be-
yond this result in discipline in accordance with the
employer's rules regarding absences;
(4) the reservist is still qualified to perform the duties of
the position; and
(5) the position was not temporary.49
Congress does not require employers to pay the reservist
during any of these types of absences.
D. Enforcement Mechanisms
Section 2025 directs the Department of Labor, through its
Veterans' Employment and Training Service, Office of Veter-
ans' Reemployment Rights, to "render aid" to individuals
seeking to assert their rights under the statute.5 0 If the area
agent believes a violation may have occurred, a contact will be
made with the employer and negotiations will ensure resolu-
tion of the matter. 1
If the matter is not settled in this fashion, either the reserv-
ist or the area agent can, pursuant to section 2022, and free of
any state statute of limitation, commence an action in the lo-
cal federal district court to compel compliance and the pay-
promotional opportunities by qualifying her for transfer to a different military occupa-
tional specialty. Id. at 911-12.
49. See 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d) (1986). See infra Appendix at 105-06.
50. The sole OVRR office in Wisconsin, located in Madison, investigated 236 re-
servist claims between December, 1983, and March, 1987, but in that span referred
none to the U.S. Attorney for litigation. Interview with James F. Purtell, Area Agent,
OVRR, in Madison, Wis. (March 31, 1987). However, previous Wisconsin cases in the
1980's have resulted in federal litigation. See, e.g., Gellendin v. Village of Brown Deer,
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2889 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 30, 1983); Zeczycki v. Trinity Memorial
Hosp., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2163 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 20, 1983).
Rights of federal employees are not handled through the OVRR, but through appeal
procedures of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. 38 U.S.C. § 2023(a) (1986).
Upon finding a violation, the OPM is directed to order the offending agency to comply
and to compensate the reservist for the lost wages and benefits. Id. See infra Appendix
at 101.
51. 38 U.S.C. § 2025 (1986). See infra Appendix at 107. The reservist may also
contact the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, 1734
N. Lynn St., Suite 206, Arlington, VA. 22209, (800) 336-4590, an agency connected
with the Department of Defense that conducts an ombudsman program to advise re-
servists and their employers about their rights and obligations under the law. The com-
mittee may also contact the employer to resolve the problem on an informal basis.
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ment of lost wages and benefits. 2 The court may not tax fees
or costs against the reservist and must advance the matter on
its calendar in order to provide a "speedy hearing." The local
U.S. Attorney is directed to appear on behalf of the reservist
to effect either an "amicable adjustment" or prosecute the ac-
tion, provided he is "reasonably satisfied" of the validity of the
reservist's claim.5 3
II. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AFFORDER THE MILITARY
RESERVIST UNDER WISCONSIN STATUTORY AND
COMMON LAW
With several exceptions, the broad protection from em-
ployment discrimination against reservists that is present in
the federal statutes is not matched, much less expanded, 54 by
Wisconsin statutory and common law.
A. Hiring
Wisconsin has no counterpart to federal protection in this
area. The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act prohibits discrim-
ination in hiring on the basis of a wide variety of factors in-
52. 38 U.S.C. § 2022 (1986). See infra Appendix at 100. Prejudgment interest can
also be awarded. Hanna v. American Motors Corp., 724 F.2d 1300, 1311 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1984) (good faith of employer not an issue); Green v.
Oktibbeha County Hosp., 526 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Miss. 1981). However, in Micalone v.
Long Island R.R., 582 F. Supp. 973, 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court refused to award
prejudgment interest where no dilatory tactics or bad faith on the part of the employer
were involved.
53. 38 U.S.C. § 2022 (1986). See infra Appendix at 100. There is, however, no
entitlement to a jury trial, the statute being governed by principles of equity. Pomon v.
General Dynamics Corp., 574 F. Supp. 147 (D. R.I. 1983).
54. The Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act expressly provides in §§ 2021(a)-(c)
that states may expand their provisions. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021(a)-(c) (1986). See infra
Appendix at 98-100. See also, Peel v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 443 F. Supp. 451 (N.D.
Fla. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979). However, the states cannot limit what
Congress has provided since that would impair a uniformity vital to the national inter-
est. Id. at 460.
Wisconsin has often enacted or retained legislation essentially parallel to that of
the federal government in order to expand on it, provide a dual means of enforcement to
assure compliance, or simply as a statement of policy. The fair employment scheme
embodied in Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-.395 (1985-86) which is a companion to federal equal
opportunity laws is a good example. See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. DILHR,
87 Wis. 2d 56, 81, 273 N.W.2d 786, 799 (Ct. App. 1978) (Wisconsin's "massive
amount" of sex discrimination legislation "touches interests deeply rooted" in the state).
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cluding age, race and creed.5 Military service or reserve
affiliation is not one of the protected categories.
Some anomalies are present in this scheme of protection.
Most relevant is the fact that individuals may not be the sub-
ject of a refusal to hire based on a "conviction record." This
is defined to include a less than honorable discharge or any
criminal sentence by military authority.5 6 As a result, in the-
ory an employer may refuse to hire an individual because of
his continuing honorable service as a military reservist but
cannot refuse to hire a former member of the military who has
been dishonorably discharged unless the conviction relates to
the circumstances of the particular job sought.57 Hopefully,
this is not an accurate reflection of the state legislature's per-
ception of values and priorities.
Prior to 1983, the state legislature did provide some very
limited protection in this area. Individuals who "willfully de-
prived" National Guardsmen (other reservists not included)
"of employment" were subjected to a fine ranging from $50 to
$200 and even, at one time, imprisonment of up to six
months.5 8 This arguably could have prohibited discrimination
in hiring although no civil remedy for the injured guardsman
was provided. 9 The legislature repealed even this limited pro-
vision noting that the guard was still protected by similar pro-
visions under federal law.60  However, as previously noted,
there was no federal hiring protection until 1986, so it is ques-
55. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.321-.322 (1985-86).
56. Wis. STAT. § 111.32(3) (1985-86).
57. WIS. STAT. § 111.335(1) (c) (1985-86). The legislature has also seen fit in Wis.
STAT. § 21.35 to require the Wisconsin National Guard to accept members without
regard to sexual orientation (a questionable requirement in any event in light of federal
rulings on the issue of homosexuals in the military) without protecting individuals
once in the Guard from discriminatory actions because of their military status. Wis.
STAT. § 21.35 (1985-86).
58. WIS. STAT. § 21.14 (1981-82), repealed by 1983 Act 27, § 621 (1983). The six-
month imprisonment provision had been repealed by 1979 Act 221, § 222 (1980).
59. It clearly required employers to grant leave for periods of active duty although
no obligation to compensate the Guardsman for salary lost in the process was imposed.
64 Op. Att'y Gen. 196 (1975).
60. The analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau, contained in the drafting
files to the repealing act, located in the LRB, State Capitol, Madison, states: "[This]
repeal[s] law on employment and association discrimination against guard members.
The guard retains its authority to enforce conduct proscribed by the repealed law under
similar provisions contained in federal law." Id.
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tionable whether the repealed provision was ever intended to
cover discriminatory hiring.
B. Incidents and Advantages of Employment
Wisconsin also provides no statutory or common law
protection in this area to supplement the federal protection
unless the reservist is a permanent state employee or official.
Such individuals are granted leaves of absence for periods of
three to fifteen work days (excluding weekends and holidays)
per year to attend "annual field training or annual active duty
for training" and military schools. 61 During this absence, the
state will pay the base state pay less the base military pay.62
The various military allotments, such as travel and per diem
expenses, are not figured into the calculation.63
C. Restoration and Retention
1. Statutory Protection
The scope of statutory rights to restoration and retention
after reserve military duty is unsettled due to vaguely worded
legislation and probably is non-existent in most instances.
However, under any interpretation it is definitely not as com-
prehensive as the federal scheme.
Permanent state employees who have attended up to fif-
teen days of annual training or military school are entitled to
full restoration of employment. The previously discussed stat-
utory right to pay supplement also provides that such leaves
of absence do not affect seniority, pay or pay advancement, or
performance awards.64 This obviously contemplates, without
expressly so stating, that the reservist enjoys full restoration
and retention rights notwithstanding this type of military
service.
61. WIs. STAT. § 230.35(3) (a) (1985-86).
62. Id. This, of course, assumes that the state pay during the period would have
exceeded military pay. The reservist retains the option to use accumulated vacation
time for the military duty, rather than the statutory leave, and collect both salaries. If
the employee is a Guardsman serving on active duty because of a state emergency, the
statute provides that he may elect to receive the normal state salary as full military pay;
this leads to the same net recovery.
63. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § ER-Pers 29.03(7) (Oc:. 1984).
64. Wis. STAT. § 230.35(3) (a) (1985-86).
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However, none of this applies to "extended active duty or
service as a member of the active armed forces."' 65 Yet an-
other statutory provision 66 provides that a permanent, "classi-
fied" 67 state employee who "enlists, is ordered or is inducted
into active service in the armed forces of the United States" is
to be restored to the same position upon completion with no
interruption in job status except for receipt of pay and ac-
cumulation of sick leave and vacation; all benefits of senior-
ity, status, pay, pay advancement, performance awards, and
pension rights are retained. Miscellaneous protections are
provided on vacation computation and restoration to proba-
tionary and seasonal status.68
In order to reclaim the job position, five factors must be
met:
1. The employee must present evidence of satisfactory
completion of service and that the discharge is other
than dishonorable or by sentence of general court-
martial.69
2. The active duty cannot exceed four years unless the ex-
cess is imposed involuntarily.
3. The employee must still be qualified to perform the job.
4. Application for restoration must be made within 180
days of release.
5. The circumstances of the employing agency "have not
changed so as to make it impossible or unreasonable" to
restore the employee.7"
As with the federal code, the last of these is troubling. The
employee is clearly dependent on the exercise of good faith by
the state if restoration is to be attained without controversy.
65. Id.
66. WIs. STAT. § 230.32(1) (1985-86). See infra Appendix at 111.
67. State of Wisconsin employees are divided into classified and unclassified catego-
ies. Unclassified workers include elected officials, University of Wisconsin faculty and
academic staff, many individuals appointed by elected officials, and a variety of others.
WIs. STAT. § 230.08(2) (1985-86). All those who are not designated unclassified are
considered classified. Wis. STAT. § 230.08(3) (1985-86). Classified employees gener-
ally enjoy greater promotion and tenure protections. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 230.15
(1985-86) (regular appointments and promotion in the classified service).
68. WIs. STAT. § 230.32(1), (2)(a), (2)(c) (1985-86). See infra Appendix at II1-
112.
69. Accordingly, a general court-martial can result in a bad conduct discharge,
which is "other than dishonorable" but would still be disqualifying under the statute.
70. Wis. STAT. § 230.32(1)(a)-(e) (1985-86). See infra Appendix at 111- 112.
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A question arises as to whether these statutory protections
are available to the reservist after serving the initial four or
more months of active duty for training or some other period
of active duty for training in excess of the normal two weeks
of annual training." The discharge contemplated by the stat-
ute is, in the absence of unusual circumstances, not some-
thing a reservist receives after completion of such duty since
his military status continues. The military differentiates be-
tween active duty for training and other, more permanent, pe-
riods of active duty. It is not clear what differentiation the
legislature intended, if any, by the reference to "active service
in the armed forces of the United States. 7v2 Fortunately, for
whatever impact it may have, the Attorney General of Wis-
consin has stated that the reservist's initial period of active
duty for training would be covered by a predecessor to the
present statute. 3
Employees of other Wisconsin governmental entities-
counties, towns, cities, villages, school districts and VTAE
districts-do not have an absolute statutory right to restora-
tion after military service, whether as a reservist or other-
wise, 74 with one limited exception.7 5  These entities are
71. Presumably there is no question that the statute covers a period of active ser-
vice by a reservist as part of an extensive call-up of reserve forces in response to a
national emergency.
72. WIS. STAT. § 230.32(1) (1985-86). See infra Appendix at 111.
73. 48 Op. Att'y Gen. 58 (1959) asserted that the then existing Wis. STAT.
§§ 16.275-76, the forerunner of Wis. STAT. § 230.32, protects reservists serving the ini-
tial six or more months of active duty for training. Opinions of the Attorney General of
Wisconsin, although not controlling, are deserving of judicial consideration. State ex
rel. City of West Allis v. Dieringer, 275 Wis. 208, 81 N.W.2d 533 (1957).
74. WIs. STAT. § 45.51 (1985-86). See infra Appendix at 109.
75. Pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 63.06 (1985-86), a "person in the classified service [of
a] county who . . . becomes an active member of the military or naval forces of the
United States during a period officially proclaimed to be a national emergency or lim-
ited national emergency or under Pub. L. No. 87-117" is entitled to leave and reinstate-
ment. WIs. STAT. § 63.06 (1985-86).
It should be noted that there is another possible broad exception. Wis. SrAT.
§ 45.50(1) (1985-86), imposes expanded reemployment rights under the conditions
stated therein and requires "any political subdivision of the state" to adhere. If that
refers to counties, cities, etc., it obviously is in conflict with the permissive tones of §
45.51 and, if interpreted strictly, would effectively render it surplusage. Perhaps the
best interpretation under the circumstances is that § 45.51 should control for such
entities since it is the more specific of the two statutes with reference to them. See, e.g..
Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 N.W.2d 817, 821 (1980) (statutes should
be construed to avoid words being rendered surplusage); Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers
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permitted, but not required, to grant a leave of absence with
reinstatement and pension rights safeguarded to an employee
or officer 76 who is "inducted or who enlists in the U.S. armed
forces" for a period of not more than four years, unless invol-
untarily retained for a longer period. However, the statute ex-
pressly prohibits these entities from paying any compensation
during the absence."
The extent to which this is intended to potentially cover
the reservist is uncertain, again due to vague language. Noth-
ing is stated about the nature of the military service that can
or cannot be covered. However, the reference to being in-
ducted contemplates a non-reservist situation. The alterna-
tive-enlistment-while consistent with reserve enlisted
service, technically would not cover officers who are commis-
sioned, but there is no apparent reason for such disparate
treatment. The best that can be stated is that a loose reading
of the statute permits such governmental agencies to protect
the reemployment status of enlisted and officer reservists serv-
ing active duty periods of varying lengths.
The final and most important category under considera-
tion- employees of private employers-are entitled to reem-
ployment if "enlisted or ... inducted or ordered into active
duty in the armed forces of the United States pursuant to the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 or the National
Guard and Reserve Officers Mobilization Act of 1940, the Se-
lective Service Act of 1948 and any acts amendatory thereof
or supplementary thereto or P.L. 87-117." 7  Consistent with
the other statutes discussed above, the application of this
scheme of protection to the reservist for active duty short of
an extended call-up is suspect.
While the "ordered into active service" language is vague
enough to cover a reservist's relatively short period of active
Corp., 65 Wis. 2d 153, 161, 222 N.W.2d 156, 160 (1974) (where two statutes deal with
the same subject matter the more specific controls).
76. Special provisions to protect the unique status of elected officials are also pro-
vided in Wis. STAT. § 45.51(4)-(6) (1985-86). See infra Appendix at 110-111.
77. Wis. STAT. § 45.51 (1985-86) was enacted pursuant to 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 154.
Prior to that time, these entities were not prohibited by statute from compensating mili-
tary personnel during absences. Cayo v. City of Milwaukee, 41 Wis, 2d 643. 165
N.W.2d 198 (1969) (upheld a city ordinance that provided for varying degrees of com-
pensation for military leave taken by reservists).
78. WIS. STAT. § 45.50 (1985-86). See infra Appendix at 107.
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duty for training, it is restricted by the requirement that it be
pursuant to the specified federal legislation. The Adjutant
General of Wisconsin, on behalf of the Wisconsin National
Guard, has taken the position that a Guardsman on two
weeks annual training is not covered by the statute because
such service is pursuant to different legislation. The Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals has agreed. 79 The same is true for other
periods of active duty for training, such as the initial four-plus
months of service performed by Guardsmen and other re-
servists, so presumably that is not covered as well.80
On the positive side, the returning employee need not pro-
vide evidence of a favorable discharge, unlike the state em-
ployee, but need only present "evidence that he has
satisfactorily completed his period of training," language that
is consistent with the nature of a reservist's service during ac-
tive duty for training. 81 However, it is doubtful that this is
sufficient to overcome the restrictive language of coverage
noted earlier; it clearly was not adequate to alter the Adjutant
General's position or that of the court of appeals.
Were the statute applicable to reservists, a seemingly im-
pressive array of additional protections and enforcement
mechanisms would be available. Not only would restoration
be granted, but the reservist would be immune from discharge
without cause within one year after restoration, 82 a signifi-
cant exception to Wisconsin's normal employment-at-will
doctrine. Enforcement would first occur with a mandated re-
ferral to the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Rela-
tions.83  Failing resolution of the dispute at that level, the
79. The attorney general has appeared as amicus curiae in Weyenberg Shoe Mfg.
Co. v. Seidl, 140 Wis. 2d 373, 410 N.W.2d 604 (Ct. App. 1987), discussed ilifra. where
the employee was serving two weeks annual training in the Wisconsin Army National
Guard pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502 (1982) which regulates participation in field exer-
cises by National Guard personnel.
80. Inactive and active duty for training non-Guard reservists is regulated by 10
U.S.C. § 270(a) (1982) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-861.
§ 1(5)(A), 72 Stat. 1438).
81. Other conditions parallel those for state employees as discussed earlier. One
significant difference is that the employee must reapply and resume work within 90 days
of completion of service, as opposed to a 180 day limitation on reapplication for the
state employee.
82. WIs. STAT. § 45.50(2) (1985-86). See infra Appendix at 108-09.
83. WIS. STAT. § 45.50(1) (1985-86). See infra Appendix at 107-108. However.
DILHR has never acted in this area, having referred all inquiries to the federal OVRR.
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employee could commence an action in the circuit court of the
employer's county to recover lost wages and benefits.84 This
type of action receives preferential treatment: the courts must
order a speedy hearing, advance the case on the calendar, and
tax no fees or costs against the employee.8 5
2. Common Law Protection
Assuming none of the statutory provisions discussed above
expressly apply to the reservist other than one who is a state
employee, the next inquiry is whether Wisconsin common law
provides reemployment and related protections. In fact, re-
cent developments in this area of law impact significantly
upon the reservist.
Prior to 1983, except where the legislature expressly re-
quired otherwise, Wisconsin followed the employment-at-will
doctrine. This doctrine recognized that where employment
was for an indefinite term, an employer could discharge an
employee for good cause, no cause, or even a morally wrong
cause, without being guilty of a legal wrong. However, in
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,86 the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin recognized the existence of a claim for relief, in the
form of reinstatement and back pay, for wrongful discharge
when the discharge is contrary to fundamental and well-de-
fined public policy as evidenced by existing law. The wrongful
discharge prohibition incorporates declarations of public pol-
icy-the state constitution and legislation-into every em-
ployment-at-will relationship. The court stressed that this
concept was "limited" and "narrowly circumscribed" and
urged courts to proceed "cautiously." It was emphasized
that no claim would exist merely because the discharged em-
ployee's conduct was praiseworthy or because the public may
have derived some benefit from it.87
The doctrine has already undergone substantial refine-
ment. The latest case from the state supreme court, Bushko v.
and is generally unaware of its powers in this regard. Interview with Michael MeClips.
Office of Information and Public Affairs, DILHR, in Madison. Wis. (May 8, 1987).
84. WIs. STAT. § 45.50(3). See infra Appendix at 109.
85. Id. Appeals can follow by utilizing the normal appellate procedure except that
the individual is not required to file an appeal bond for the security for costs.
86. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
87. Id. at 577-78, 335 N.W.2d at 840-41.
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Miller Brewing Co.," reemphasized the restrictiveness of the
doctrine by holding that activities by the employee that are
merely consistent with public policy do not provide a basis for
a wrongful discharge claim. A claim exists only if the dis-
charge results from refusing a command to violate a public
policy as established by statutory or constitutional provisions.
For example, Bushko held that a supervisor who alleged he
was discharged for complaining about his employer's policies
on plant safety and other matters had no claim for wrongful
discharge.89 Commentators have viewed Bushko as leaving
little doubt about the limited scope of the wrongful discharge
principle although acknowledging the possible "tenuous" na-
ture of this limitation in light of contrary views by three con-
curring justices.90
The availability of a wrongful discharge claim to a reserv-
ist terminated because of military obligations was squarely
faced in Weyenberg Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Seidl.91 Allan
Seidl was employed by Weyenberg as Chief Accountant from
1975 to June 13, 1983 and also served in the Wisconsin Army
National Guard with the rank of Sergeant Major. Weyenberg
had a written policy requiring employees to give notice of ab-
sences to their superiors, although notification in writing was
not required. Seidl had given sufficient notice of an upcoming
two-week absence for annual training. However, the issue
centered on whether he had given ample notice to Weyenberg
of his need to miss an additional day of work at the beginning
of this two-week period. Seidl himself was given only a few
hours notice that he had to report early. He claimed he re-
peatedly attempted to call his supervisor-the company treas-
urer-but found him unavailable. As an alternative, he
informed one of his own subordinates as well as the person in
charge of time records and then left.92
Weyenberg terminated Seidl on the day he returned from
annual training. Citing other alleged absences without notice
88. 134 Wis. 2d 136, 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986).
89. Id. at 147, 396 N.W.2d at 172.
90. Whyte & Duffy, Supreme Court Clarifies Scope of Wrongfiul Discharge, 60 Wis.
B. Bul.L. 25 (March 1987).
91. 140 Wis. 2d 373, 410 N.W.2d 604 (Ct. App. 1987). No petition for review was
filed with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
92. Id. at 378-79, 410 N.W.2d at 606.
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as well as this latest incident, the company said that one of the
main reasons for discharge was his failure to keep his supervi-
sor advised of his whereabouts.93 The company commenced
an action to recover a loan made to Seidl and he counter-
claimed alleging, in relevant part, that he had been wrongfully
discharged because of his military obligations in violation of
38 U.S.C. section 2021-2691 and section 45.50 of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes.95 The circuit court refused to allow Seidl to pur-
sue his claim on the basis of the federal legislation but allowed
the wrongful discharge claim based on state law to continue.
A jury found that Seidl had been wrongfully terminated from
his employment contrary to public policy and awarded him
$57,000 in "damages" (presumably lost pay), $15,000 in "lost
employee benefits," and $35,000 in "lost future earnings."
The circuit court awarded Seidl judgment for $107,000, plus
costs, less the loan, in accordance with the verdict. 96
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals both affirmed in part and
reversed in part. It reversed the circuit court on whether
there was a state law basis for the action, concluding that
there was no claim under section 45.50 because National
Guard annual training is not "active service in the Armed
Forces of the United States" pursuant to the specified federal
statutes.97 The Court of Appeals next read Bushko in strict
fashion and held that Seidl could not claim wrongful dis-
charge because his action in going to annual training was con-
sistent with public policy rather than a refusal to violate
public policy.98
However, the appellate court reversed on the issue of
whether Seidl should have been permitted to assert his federal
rights in state court. The court found no express congres-
sional prohibition of such a course of action, section 2022
merely designating the federal district court as empowered to
hear such claims without indicating state courts could not do
93. Id. at 378-90, 410 N.W.2d at 106-07.
94. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-26 (1986).
95. WIs. STAT. § 45.50 (1985-86). See infra Appendix at 107.
96. Weyenberg Shoe, 140 Wis. 2d at 376, 410 N.W.2d at 605.
97. Id. at 318-83, 410 N.W.2d at 607-08. This conclusion was apparently reached
largely because the Adjutant General of Wisconsin conceded the point, as discussed
earlier. Id.
98. Id. at 382-83, 410 N.W.2d at 608.
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the same. Thus, the court held that the presumption in favor
of state court concurrent jurisdiction over civil causes of ac-
tion arising under federal statutes was controlling.99 The
court added that the reservist would be advantaged by
"greater accessibility" to local state courts.100 Since the court
of appeals upheld the jury's conclusion that Seidl's termina-
tion was for his participation in National Guard exercises as
established by the sufficiency of the evidence, it also affirmed
the judgment on his behalf, but, as noted, based on federal
rather than state law. 1 1
The assessment of the impact of Weyenberg Shoe on the
military reservist's employment protections in Wisconsin is
mixed. On the negative side, it confirms the suspicion that, at
least for National Guardsmen, the state statutes provide no
assistance. It also confirms, in a reservist employment con-
text, the unavailability of the narrow wrongful discharge
theory.
On a positive note, the Weyenberg Shoe holding reaffirms
the strength of the federal statutory scheme and supports the
proposition that it can be pursued in state court. The benefit
of these conclusions is debatable. Although in some cases the
reservist might be geographically closer to the state court,
those courts probably are not able to process a case of this
type faster than a federal court in light of the burden on the
latter to hold a "speedy hearing." In addition, state courts
have less expertise than their federal counterparts in these
types of cases. Finally, by proceeding in state court the re-
servist loses the potential for free representation by the U.S.
Attorney.
III. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin military reservist, as does his or her coun-
terpart throughout the United States, enjoys broad protec-
tions against adverse treatment in the workplace occasioned
99. Id. at 384-87, 410 N.W.2d at 609-10. See, e.g.. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981); Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 482, 254 N.W.2d
704, 711 (1977).
100. Weyenberg Shoe, 140 Wis. 2d at 387, 410 N.W.2d at 610.
101. Id. at 387-89, 410 N.W.2d at 610. Seidl was also awarded prejudgment inter-
est but was denied attorney's fees in accordance with the federal statutes. Id. at 389-90.
410 N.W.2d at 610-11.
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by the military obligation. Nondiscriminatory hiring, treat-
ment while employed, and retention are guaranteed, with
qualification existing only as to the scope of the protection in
certain areas relating to incidents and advantages of employ-
ment. Further, an effective enforcement mechanism is in
place: The reservist can utilize the services of the Department
of Labor's Office of Veteran's Reemployment Rights to assure
compliance and, where necessary, commence suit in federal
court, possibly with the assistance of the Department of Jus-
tice, to recover the lost position, back wages, etc. These rights
all exist as a result of federal legislation.
The federal statutes permit the states to grant additional
rights to the military reservist. However, unless the reservist
is a state employee, nothing additional-or even equivalent-
is present in this state. Wisconsin has no prohibition against a
discriminatory refusal to hire; no prohibition against disparate
treatment in the workplace; and no guarantee of retention af-
ter active duty unless it is in conjunction with active duty re-
sulting from a call-up, as opposed to routine training, and
even this is uncertain. Wisconsin's once developing common
law against wrongful discharge might have provided an ave-
nue for relief in some circumstances, but the recent decisions
of Bushko and Weyenberg Shoe have greatly restricted that
possibility.
Wisconsin's oft-asserted and touted progressivism has not
yet been clearly activated by the state legislature to protect the
reservist. Particularly in the area of incidents and advantages
of employment, in which federal protections may be limited,
and when a National Guardsman is performing state active
service, Wisconsin should certainly act to protect the reservist.
The state definitely has a legitimate local public interest to
protect its reservists-particularly its National Guardsmen
who perform state service in time of disaster and emergency-
that justifies such legislation.
Regardless of the legal protection afforded to the reserv-
ist, in the end, the best assurance of smooth interaction be-
tween civilian and military responsibilities with minimal
disruption and loss to both is voluntary compliance by the em-
ployer. The reservist can help foster that attitude on the part




FEDERAL STATUTES (38 U.S.C. (1986))
§ 2021. RIGHT TO REEMPLOYMENT OF INDUCTED
PERSONS; BENEFITS PROTECTED
(a) In the case of any person who is inducted into the
Armed Forces of the United States under the Military Selec-
tive Service Act (or under any prior or subsequent corre-
sponding law) for training and service and who leaves a
position (other than a temporary position) in the employ of
any employer in order to perform such training and service,
and (1) receives a certificate described in section 9(a) of the
Military Selective Service Act (relating to the satisfactory
completion of military service), and (2) makes application for
reemployment within ninety days after such person is relieved
from such training and service or from hospitalization contin-
uing after discharge for a period of not more than one year-
(A) if such position was in the employ of the United
States Government, its territories, or possessions, or polit-
ical subdivisions thereof, or the District of Columbia, such
person shall-
(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such
position, be restored to such position or to a position of
like seniority, status, and pay; or
(ii) if not qualified to perform the duties of such
position, by reason of disability sustained during such
service, but qualified to perform the duties of any other
position in the employ of the employer, be offered em-
ployment and, if such person so requests, be employed
in such other position the duties of which such person
is qualified to perform as will provide such person like
seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest approximation
thereof consistent with the circumstances in such per-
son's case;
(B) If such position was in the employ of a State, or
political subdivision thereof, or a private employer, such
person shall-
(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such
position, be restored by such employer or the em-
ployer's successor in interest to such position or to a
position of like seniority, status, and pay; or
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(ii) if not qualified to perform the duties of such
position by reason of disability sustained during such
service, but qualified to perform the duties of any other
position in the employ of such employer or the em-
ployer's successor in interest, be offered employment
and, if such person so requests, be employed by such
employer or the employer's successor in interest in
such other position the duties of which such person is
qualified to perform as will provide such person like
seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest approximation
thereof consistent with the circumstances in such per-
son's case, unless the employer's circumstances have so
changed as tomake it impossible or unreasonable to do
so. Nothing in this chapter shall excuse noncompli-
ance with any statute or ordinance of a State or polit-
ical subdivision thereof establishing greater or
additional rights or protections than the rights and
protections established pursuant to this chapter.
(b)(1) Any person who is restored to or employed in
a position in accordance with the provisions of clause (A)
or (B) of subsection (a) of this section shall be considered
as having been on furlough or leave of absence during such
person's period of training and service in the Armed
Forces, shall be so restored or reemployed without loss of
seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or
other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to estab-
lished rules and practices relating to employees on fur-
lough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the
time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall
not be discharged from such position without cause within
one year after such restoration or reemployment.
(2) It is hereby declared to be the sense of the Con-
gress that any person who is restored to or employed in a
position in accordance with the provisions of clause (A) or
(B) of subsection (a) of this section should be so restored
or reemployed in such manner as to give such person such
status in the person's employment as the person would
have enjoyed if such person had continued in such em-
ployment continuously from the time of such person's en-
tering the Armed Forces until the time of such person's
restoration to such employment, or reemployment.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
(3) Any person who seeks or holds a position de-
scribed in clause (A) or (B) of subsection (a) of this section
shall not be denied hiring, retention in employment, or any
promotion or other incident or advantage of employment
because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve com-
ponent of the Armed Forces.
(c) The rights granted by subsections (a) and (b) of
this section to persons who left the employ of a State or
political subdivision thereof and were inducted into the
Armed Forces shall not diminish any rights such persons
may have pursuant to any statute or ordinance of such
State or political subdivision establishing greater or addi-
tional rights or protections.
§ 2022. ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
If any employer, who is a private employer or a State or
political subdivision thereof, fails or refuses to comply with
the provisions of section 2021(a), (b)(1), or (b)(3), or 2024 of
this title, the district court of the United States for any district
in which such private employer maintains a place of business,
or in which such State or political subdivision thereof exer-
cises authority or carriers [sic] out its functions, shall have the
power, upon the filing of a motion, petition, or other appropri-
ate pleading by the person entitled to the benefits of such pro-
visions, specifically to require such employer to comply with
such provisions and to compensate such person for any loss of
wages or benefits suffered by reason of such employer's unlaw-
ful action. Any such compensation shall be in addition to and
shall not be deemed to diminish any of the benefits provided
for in such provisions. Upon application to the United States
attorney or comparable official for any district in which such
private employer maintains a place of business, or in which
such State or political subdivision thereof exercises authority
or carries out its functions, by any person claiming to be enti-
tled to the benefits provided for in such provisions, such
United States attorney or official, if reasonably satisfied that
the person so applying is entitled to such benefits, shall appear
and act as attorney for such person in the amicable adjust-
ment of the claim or in the filing of any motion, petition, or
other appropriate pleading and the prosecution thereof specifi-
cally to require such employer to comply with such provi-
[Vol. 71:75
1987] EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF MILITARY RESERVIST 101
sions. No fees or court costs shall be taxed against any person
who may apply for such benefits. In any such action only the
employer shall be deemed a necessary party respondent. No
State statute of limitations shall apply to any proceedings
under this chapter.
§ 2023. REEMPLOYMENT BY THE UNITED STATES,
TERRITORY, POSSESSION, OR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
(a) Any person who is entitled to be restored to or em-
ployed in a position in accordance with the provisions of
clause (A) of section 2021(a) and who was employed, immedi-
ately before entering the Armed Forces, by any agency in the
executive branch of the Government or by any territory or
possession, or political subdivision thereof, or by the District
of Columbia, shall be so restored or reemployed by such
agency or the successor to its functions, or by such territory,
possession, political subdivision, or the District of Columbia.
In any case in which, upon appeal of any person who was
employed, immediately before entering the Armed Forces, by
any agency in the executive branch of the Government or by
the District of Columbia, the Director of the Office of Person-
nel Management finds that-
(1) such agency is no longer in existence and its func-
tions have not been transferred to any other agency; or
(2) for any reason it is not feasible for such person to
be restored to employment by such agency or by the Dis-
trict of Columbia;the Director shall determine whether or
not there is a position in any other agency in the executive
branch of the Government or in the government of the Dis-
trict of Columbia for which such person is qualified and which
is either vacant or held by a person having a temporary ap-
pointment thereto. In any case in which the Director deter-
mines that there is such a position, such person shall be
offered employment and, if such person so requests, be em-
ployed in such position by the agency in which such position
exists or by the government of the District of Columbia, as the
case may be. The Director is authorized and directed to issue
regulations giving full force and effect to the provisions of this
section insofar as they relate to persons entitled to be restored
to or employed in positions in the executive branch of the
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Government or in the government of the District of Colum-
bia, including persons entitled to be reemployed under the last
sentence of subsection (b) of this section. The agencies in the
executive branch of the Government and the government of
the District of Columbia shall comply with such rules, regula-
tions, and orders issued by the Director pursuant to this sub-
section. The Director is authorized and directed when the
Director finds, upon appeal of the person concerned, that any
agency in the executive branch of the Government or the gov-
ernment of the District of Columbia has failed or refuses to
comply with the provisions of this section, to issue an order
specifically requiring such agency or the government of the
District of Columbia to comply with such provisions and to
compensate such person for any loss of salary or wages suf-
fered by reason of failure to comply with such provisions, less
any amounts received by such person through other employ-
ment, unemployment compensation, or readjustment al-
lowances. Any such compensation ordered to be paid by the
Director shall be in addition to and shall not be deemed to
diminish any of the benefits provided for in such provisions,
and shall be paid by the head of the agency concerned or by
the government of the District of Columbia out of appropria-
tions currently available for salary and expenses of such
agency or government, and such appropriations shall be avail-
able for such purpose. As used in this chapter, the term
''agency in the executive branch of the Government" means
any department, independent establishment, agency, or corpo-
ration in the executive branch of the United States Govern-
ment (including the United States Postal Service and the
Postal Rate Commission).
(b) Any person who is entitled to be restored to or em-
ployed in a position in accordance with the provisions of
clause (A) of section 2021(a) of this title, and who was em-
ployed, immediately before entering the Armed Forces, in the
legislative branch of the Government, shall be so restored or
employed by the officer who appointed such person to the po-
sition which such person held immediately before entering the
Armed Forces. In any case in which it is not possible for any
such person to be restored to or employed in a position in the
legislative branch of the Government and such person is
otherwise eligible to acquire a status for transfer to a position
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in the competitive service in accordance with section 3304(c)
of Title 5, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management
shall, upon appeal of such person, determine whether or not
there is a position in the executive branch of the Government
for which such person is qualified and which is either vacant
or held by a person having a temporary appointment thereto.
In any case in which the Director determines that there is
such a position, such person shall be offered employment and,
if such person so requests, be employed in such position by the
agency in which such position exists.
(c) Any person who is entitled to be restored to or em-
ployed in a position in accordance with the provisions of
clause (A) of section 2021(a) of this title and who was em-
ployed, immediately before entering the Armed Forces, in the
judicial branch of the Government, shall be so restored or
reemployed by the officer who appointed such person to the
position which such person held immediately before entering
the Armed Forces.
§ 2024. RIGHTS OF PERSONS WHO ENLIST OR ARE
CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY; RESERVES
(a) Any person who, after entering the employment on
the basis of which such person claims restoration or reemploy-
ment, enlists in the Armed Forces of the United States (other
than in a Reserve component) shall be entitled upon release
from service under honorable conditions to all of the reem-
ployment rights and other benefits provided for by this section
in the case of persons inducted under the provisions of the
Military Selective Service Act (or prior or subsequent legisla-
tion providing for the involuntary induction of persons into
the Armed Forces), if the total of such person's service per-
formed between June 24, 1948, and August 1, 1961, did not
exceed four years, and the total of any service, additional or
otherwise, performed by such person after August 1, 1961,
does not exceed five years, and if the service in excess of four
years after August 1, 1961, is at the request and for the con-
venience of the Federal Government (plus in each case any
period of additional service imposed pursuant to law).
(b)(1) Any person who, after entering the employment
on the basis of which such person claims restoration or reem-
ployment, enters upon active duty (other than for the purpose
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of determining physical fitness and other than for training),
whether or not voluntarily, in the Armed Forces of the United
States or the Public Health Service in response to an order or
call to active duty shall, upon such person's relief from active
duty under honorable conditions, be entitled to all of the
reemployment rights and benefits provided for by this chapter
in the case of persons inducted under the provisions of the
Military Selective Service Act (or prior or subsequent legisla-
tion providing for the involuntary induction of persons into
the Armed Forces), if the total of such active duty performed
between June 24, 1948, and August 1, 1961, did not exceed
four years, and the total of any such active duty, additional or
otherwise, performed after August 1, 1961, does not exceed
four years (plus in each case any additional period in which
such person was unable to obtain orders relieving such person
from active duty).
(2) Any member of a Reserve component of the Armed
Forces of the United States who voluntarily or involuntarily
enters upon active duty (other than for the purpose of deter-
mining physical fitness and other than for training) or whose
active duty is voluntarily or involuntarily extended during a
period when the President is authorized to order units of the
Ready Reserve or members of a Reserve component to active
duty shall have the service limitation governing eligibility for
reemployment rights under subsection (b)(1) of this section
extended by such member's period of such active duty, but not
to exceed that period of active duty to which the President is
authorized to order units of the Ready Reserve or members of
a Reserve component. With respect to a member who volun-
tarily enters upon active duty or whose active duty is volunta-
rily extended, the provisions of this subsection shall apply
only when such additional active duty is at the request and for
the convenience of the Federal Government.
(c) Any member of a Reserve component of the Armed
Forces of the United States who is ordered to an initial period
of active duty for training of not less than twelve consecutive
weeks shall, upon application for reemployment within thirty-
one days after (1) such member's release from such active
duty for training after satisfactory service, or (2) such mem-
ber's discharge from hospitalization incident to such active
duty for training, or one year after such member's release
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from such training, whichever is earlier, be entitled to all re-
employment rights and benefits provided by this chapter for
persons inducted under the provisions of the Military Selec-
tive Service Act (or prior or subsequent legislation providing
for the involuntary induction of persons into the Armed
Forces), except that (A) any person restored to or employed in
a position in accordance with the provisions of this subsection
shall not be discharged from such position without cause
within six months after that restoration, and (B) no reem-
ployment rights granted by this subsection shall entitle any
person to retention, preference, or displacement rights over
any veteran with a superior claim under those provisions of
Title 5 relating to veterans and other preference eligibles.
(d) Any employee not covered by subsection (c) of this
section who holds a position described in clause (A) or (B) of
section 2021(a) shall upon request be granted a leave of ab-
sence by such person's employer for the period required to
perform active duty for training or inactive duty training in
the Armed Forces of the United States. Upon such em-
ployee's release from a period of such active duty for training
or inactive duty training, or upon such employee's discharge
from hospitalization incident to that training, such employee
shall be permitted to return to such employee's position with
such seniority, status, pay, and vacation as such employee
would have had if such employee had not been absent for such
purposes. Such employee shall report for work at the begin-
ning of the next regularly scheduled working period after ex-
piration of the last calendar day necessary to travel from the
place of training to the place of employment following such
employee's release, or within a reasonable time thereafter if
delayed return is due to factors beyond the employee's con-
trol. Failure to report for work at such next regularly sched-
uled working period shall make the employee subject to the
conduct rules of the employer pertaining to explanations and
discipline with respect to absence from scheduled work. If
such an employee is hospitalized incident to active duty for
training or inactive duty training, such employee shall be re-
quired to report for work at the beginning of the next regu-
larly scheduled work period after expiration of the time
necessary to travel from the place of discharge from hospi-
talization to the place of employment, or within a reasonable
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time thereafter if delayed return is due to factors beyond the
employee's control, or within one year after such employee's
release from active duty for training or inactive duty training,
whichever is earlier. If an employee covered by this subsec-
tion is not qualified to perform the duties of such employee's
position by reason of disability sustained during active duty
for training or inactive duty training, but is qualified to per-
form the duties of any other position in the employ of the em-
ployer or such employer's successor in interest, such employee
shall be offered employment and, if such person so requests,
be employed by that employer or such employer's successor in
interest in such other position the duties of which such em-
ployee is qualified to perform as will provide such employee
like seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest approximation
thereof consistent with the circumstances in such employee's
case.
(e) Any employee not covered by subsection (c) of this
section who holds a position described in clause (A) or (B) of
section 2021(a) shall be considered as having been on leave of
absence during the period required to report for the purpose
of being inducted into, entering, or determining, by a pre-in-
duction or other examination, physical fitness to enter the
Armed Forces. Upon such employee's rejection, upon com-
pletion of such employee's pre-induction or other examina-
tion, or upon such employee's discharge from hospitalization
incident to such rejection or examination, such employee
shall be permitted to return to such employee's position in ac-
cordance with the provisions of subsection (d) of this section.
(f) For the purposes of subsections (c) and (d) of this
section, full-time training or other full-time duty performed
by a member of the National Guard under sections 316, 502,
503, 504, or 505 of Title 32 is considered active duty for train-
ing. For the purposes of subsection (d) of this section, inactive
duty training performed by that member under section 502 of
title 32 or sections 206, 301, 309, 402, or 1002 of title 37 is
considered inactive duty training.
(g) Any member of a Reserve component of the Armed
Forces of the United States who is ordered to active duty for
not more than 90 days under section 673(b) of Title 10,
United States Code, whether or not voluntarily, shall be enti-
tled to all reemployment rights and benefits provided under
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subsection (c) of this section for persons ordered to an initial
period of active duty for training of not less than twelve con-
secutive weeks; and shall have the service limitation gov-
erning eligibility for reemployment rights under subsections
(a) and (b)(1) of this section extended by the period of such
active duty.
§ 2025. ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING REEMPLOYMENT
The Secretary of Labor, through the Office of Veterans'
Reemployment Rights, shall render aid in the replacement in
their former positions or reemployment of persons who
have satisfactorily completed any period of active duty in the
Armed Forces or the Public Health Service. In rendering
such aid, the Secretary shall use existing Federal and State
agencies engaged in similar or related activities and shall util-
ize the assistance of volunteers.
§ 2026. PRIOR RIGHTS FOR REEMPLOYMENT
In any case in which two or more persons who are entitled
to be restored to or employed in a position under the provi-
sions of this chapter or of any other law relating to similar
reemployment benefits left the same position in order to enter
the Armed Forces, the person who left such position first shall
have the prior right to be restored thereto or reemployed on
the basis thereof, without prejudice to the reemployment
rights of the other person or persons to be restored or
reemployed.
WISCONSIN STATUTES
§ 45.50 REEMPLOYMENT IN CIVIL EMPLOYMENT AFTER
COMPLETION OF MILITARY SERVICE.
(1) Any person who has enlisted or enlists in or who has
been or is inducted or ordered into active service in the armed
forces of the United States pursuant to the selective training
and service act of 1940 or the national guard and reserve of-
ficers mobilization act of 1940, the selective service act of 1948
and any acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto or
P.L. 87-117, and any person whose services are requested by
the federal government for national defense work as a civilian
during a period officially proclaimed to be a national emer-
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gency or a limited national emergency, who, in order to per-
form such training or service, has left or leaves a position,
other than a temporary position, in the employ of any political
subdivision of the state or in the employ of any private or
other employer, shall be restored to such position or to a posi-
tion of like seniority, status, pay and salary advancement as
though his service toward seniority, status, pay or salary ad-
vancement had not been interrupted by such absence; pro-
vided that (a) he presents to the employer evidence that he has
satisfactorily completed his period of training or civilian ser-
vice, or that he has been discharged from the armed forces
under conditions other than dishonorable, (b) he is still quali-
fied to perform the duties of such position, (c) he makes ap-
plication for reemployment and resumes work within 90 days
after he completed such training or services, military or civil-
ian, or was so discharged from the armed forces, or within 6
months after release from hospitalization for service-con-
nected injury or disease, (d) the employer's circumstances
have not so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable
to so restore such person, and (e) the military service was not
for more than 4 years unless extended by law. In the event of
any dispute arising under this subsection the matter shall be
referred to the department of industry, labor and human rela-
tions for determination except as such matters pertain to any
classified employee of the state, in which case the matter shall
be referred to the director of personnel. Orders and determi-
nations of the department of industry, labor and human rela-
tions under this section may be reviewed in the manner
provided in ch. 227.
(2) The service of any person who is or was restored to a
position in accordance with sub.(l) shall be deemed not to be
interrupted by the absence, except for the receipt of pay or
other compensation for the period of the absence and he or
she shall be entitled to participate in insurance, pensions, re-
tirement plans or other benefits offered by the employer under
established rules and practices relating to employes on fur-
lough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the
time the person entered or was enlisted, inducted or ordered
into the forces and service, and shall not be discharged from
the position without cause within one year after restoration;
and the discharge is subject to all federal or state law affecting
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any municipal or private employment; and subject to the pro-
visions of contracts that may exist between employer and em-
ploye. Each county, town, city or village shall contribute or
pay from September 16, 1940, all contributions of the em-
ployer to the applicable and existent pension, annuity or re-
tirement system as though the service of the employe had not
been interrupted by military service.
(3) In case any employer fails or refuses to comply with
the provisions of subs. (1) and (2), any court of record
whether created by general or special act in the proper county
having jurisdiction of an action on contract for an amount ex-
ceeding $500 may, upon the filing of a motion, petition or
other appropriate pleading and on reasonable notice, which
shall not be less than 10 days, to such employer by the person
entitled to the benefits of such provisions, specifically require
such employer to comply with such provisions, and, as an in-
cident thereto, compensate such person for any loss of wages
or benefits suffered by reason of such employer's unlawful ac-
tion. The court shall order a speedy hearing in any such case
and shall advance it on the calendar. No fees or court costs
shall be taxed against the person so applying for such benefits.
The place of the commencement of the action or proceeding
hereunder against a private employer, and the trial or hearing
thereof, shall be in any county in which the employment took
place or in which such private employer maintains a place of
business, and in all other cases shall be as provided in
§ 801.50. No person who is appointed in the service of the
state or of any county, city or village to fill the place of a per-
son so entering the federal armed forces shall acquire perma-
nent tenure during such period of replacement service.
(4) Any individual or employer aggrieved by the decision
of the court provided in sub. (3) may appeal in accordance
with the provisions of appealable orders referred to in chs. 808
and 809; and the employe need not file an appeal bond for the
security for costs on said appeal.
(5) The restoration of classified employes of the state
shall be governed by § 230.32. The restoration of unclassified
state employes shall be governed by this section.
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§ 45.51 EMPLOYES OR OFFICERS IN MILITARY SERVICE.
(1) The governing body of any county, town, city, village,
school district or vocational, technical and adult education
district may grant a leave of absence to any employe or officer
who is inducted or who enlists in the U.S. armed forces for a
period of military service of not more than 4 years unless such
employe is involuntarily retained for a longer period. No sal-
ary or compensation of such employe or officer shall be paid,
nor claim therefor exist during such leave of absence.
(2) The governing body may provide for safeguarding
the reinstatement and pension rights, as herein limited, of any
employe or officer so inducted or enlisted.
(3) No employe or officer who is appointed to fill the
place of any employe or officer so inducted or enlisted shall
acquire permanent tenure during such period of replacement
service.
(4) If such leave of absence is or has been granted to an
elected or appointed official or employe and he has begun his
federal service, a temporary vacancy shall be deemed to exist
and a successor may be appointed to fill the unexpired term of
such official or employe, or until such official or employe re-
turns and files his election to resume his office as hereinafter
provided for if the date of such filing be prior to the expiration
of such term. Such appointment shall be made in the manner
provided for the filling of vacancies caused by death, resigna-
tion or otherwise, except that no election need be held to fill
any part of such temporary vacancy. The appointee shall
have all the powers, duties, liabilities and responsibilities and
shall be paid and receive the compensation and other emolu-
ments pertaining to the office or position, unless otherwise
provided by the governing body. Within 40 days after the ter-
mination of such federal service such elected or appointed offi-
cial or employe, upon filing with the clerk his statement under
oath of such termination and that he elects to resume his office
or position, may resume such office or position for the remain-
der of the term for which he was elected or appointed. The
person temporarily filling the vacancy shall thereupon cease to
hold the office.
(6) In cities of the 3rd class with a commission plan of
government, in case of temporary or permanent vacancies in
the office of mayor, the vice mayor shall temporarily succeed
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to the office of mayor for the balance of the unexpired term for
which the mayor was elected unless sooner terminated as pro-
vided in § 17.035(3). The temporary or permanent vacancy
thereby created in the office of council member may there-
upon be filled as provided in this section. The term of the
person appointed temporarily to the office of council member
shall not extend beyond the expiration of the term of the office
vacated and the temporary term shall be vacated sooner as
provided in § 17.035(3).
§ 230.32 RESTORATION AFTER MILITARY LEAVE.
(1) Any classified employe of this state, except a limited
term employe, who enlists, is ordered or is inducted into ac-
tive service in the armed forces of the United States or who is
requested to work for the federal government during a na-
tional emergency or a limited national emergency, shall be re-
stored to the same or similar position in the classified service
and his or her employment shall be deemed not to have been
interrupted by such leave except for the receipt of pay or other
compensation, accumulation of sick leave and accumulation
of vacation for the period of such absence and the employe
shall be given all the benefits of seniority, status, pay, pay ad-
vancement, performance awards and pension rights under ch.
40 as though the state employment was continuous, if:
(a) The employe presents to the appointing authority a
certificate or other evidence that he or she has satisfactorily
completed the period of training or service, and discharge is
other than dishonorable or other than by reason of the sen-
tence of a general court martial, or other than on the ground
of being a conscientious objector who refused to perform mili-
tary duty or refused to wear the uniform or otherwise to com-
ply with lawful orders of competent military authorities, or
other than as a deserter or of an officer by the acceptance of a
resignation for the good of the service.
(b) The period of service is not more than 4 years unless
involuntarily retained for a longer period.
(c) The employe is still qualified to perform the duties of
such position.
(d) The employe makes application for restoration
within 180 days after release from such training or services, or
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hospitalization continuing after discharge because of injuries
or sickness resulting from such training or service.
(e) The circumstances of the employing agency have not
changed so as to make it impossible or unreasonable to so re-
store such employe.
(2)(a) Any employe with permanent status in class who
leaves state service for the reasons specified in this section and
who has used the yearly vacation in anticipation of a full
year's employment is presumed not to have interrupted em-
ployment as far as vacation pay is concerned, and any portion
of the vacation for which the employe was paid which is
unearned at the time of being called to duty may be made up
upon return to state service. If the employe does not return to
the state service, the employe shall within 2 years after termi-
nation of leave repay the state the amount not earned. The
application of this provision is retroactive to all state employes
called to active duty under P.L. 87-117 (10 U.S.C. 263).
(b) Any classified employe who was serving the proba-
tionary period, except in the capacity of a substitute, when he
or she left state service shall, under this section, be restored to
that point of service in the probationary period as though state
employment had not been so interrupted.
(c) Any classified employe who had attained restoration
rights as a seasonal employe when he or she left state service
shall, under this section, be restored to such seasonal position
or eligibility as though the service or eligibility had not been
so interrupted.
(3)(a) Any classified employe who leaves state service
and enters the armed forces of the United States shall, under
this section, be granted written military leave of absence by
the appointing authority. Notice of such leave from state ser-
vice and the terms of any such leave shall be given in writing
by the appointing authority to the secretary for purposes of
record.
(b) Any classified employe who leaves state service for
civilian employment in response to a specific request or order
of the federal government or any of its agencies in connection
with manpower redistribution and utilization shall, under
this section, make written application to the appointing au-
thority for civilian leave of absence presenting such specific
request or order of the federal government as supporting evi-
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dence. Such civilian leave shall be allowed by the appointing
authority and its terms, which shall conform to the rules of
the secretary, shall be in writing. Notice of such leave from
state service shall be made in writing by the appointing au-
thority to the secretary for purposes of record.
(c) All such military or civilian leaves of absence as here-
tofore may have been granted are validated and shall be
deemed to be sufficient and effective hereunder. Such leaves
shall be recorded with the secretary.
(4) Any person appointed to fill the position of an em-
ploye on such military or civilian leave shall be designated as a
substitute or replacement employe and upon the return and
reemployment of the original employe the substitute employe
shall be transferred to a similar position with the same em-
ploying agency if one is available, or if not, he or she shall be
eligible for reinstatement or have the right of restoration in
accordance with this subchapter and the rules of the ad-
ministrator. The status of any person who is appointed to fill
the place of an employe on military or civilian leave under this
section shall be governed by the rules of the administrator
pursuant thereto.
(5) The restoration of classified former employes of the
state shall be governed by this section and by the rules of the
administrator.
(6) Any classified employe on June 5, 1953, who entered
the service of the United States in civilian war emergency em-
ployment on or after January 1, 1942, and who was not at the
time of such entry an employe of the state, and who on No-
vember 16, 1946, in accordance with P.L. 79-549 was trans-
ferred to the service of this state shall have such seniority
rights as though having been a member of the classified ser-
vice of the state during the period of employment in the ser-
vice of the United States.
§ 230.35 STATE OFFICE HOURS; STANDARD WORK WEEK;
LEAVES OF ABSENCE; HOLIDAYS
(3)(a) Officials and employes of the state who have per-
manent status and who are members of the national guard, the
state guard, or any other reserve component of the military
forces of, the United States or this state now or hereafter or-
ganized or constituted under federal or state law, are entitled
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to leaves of absence without loss of time in the service of the
state, to enable them to attend military schools and annual
field training or annual active duty for training, and any other
state or federal tours of active duty, except extended active
duty or service as a member of the active armed forces of the
United States which have been duly ordered but not exceeding
15 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays enumer-
ated in sub. (4) in the calendar year in which so ordered and
held. During this leave of absence, each state official or em-
ploye shall receive base state pay less the base military pay
received for and identified with such attendance but such re-
duction shall not be more than the base state pay. Such leave
shall not be granted for absences of less than 3 days. A state
official or employe serving on state active duty as a member of
the national guard or state guard, may elect to receive pay
from the state under § 20.465(1) in an amount equal to base
state salary for such period of state active duty. Leave
granted by this section is in addition to all other leaves
granted or authorized by any other law. For the purpose of
determining seniority, pay or pay advancement and perform-
ance awards the status of the employe shall be considered un-
interrupted by such attendance.
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